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Limitations on Commissioner's Power to
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BY THOMAS J . GRAVES

Partner, Executive Office
Presented before the New York University Nineteenth Annual
Institute on Federal Taxation, New York — November 1960

the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, there has
been a marked increase in the frequency and significance of questions regarding tax accounting methods. This has been caused not so
much by any lack of clarity in the accounting provisions of the Code,
most of which are merely re-enactments of earlier provisions, as by the
increased attention to several problems of longstanding that resulted
from discussion and consideration of the few tax accounting rules that
were new in the Code.
The statutory recognition given to prepaid income and estimated
expenses in 1954 caused many taxpayers to find tax-saving improvements and corrections in their accounting, some of which seemed
usable even after the new rules were repealed. The Treasury's dissatisfaction with these new rules and with those of section 481, which
was enacted to provide an orderly and reasonable basis for dealing
with adjustments resulting from accounting-method changes, forced
its staff into greater awareness of tax-accounting concepts. A s a
result, both tax practitioners and the Internal Revenue Service are
more sophisticated in these matters today than they were in 1954.
This greater awareness has led to a better understanding of the
advantages to be gained from correction and changing accounting
methods. Taxpayers have been interested primarily in revisions that
would tend to reduce their tax liabilities, such as corrections of their
treatment of accruable liabilities deducted erroneously on a cash basis
in earlier years. There are many instances, however, where tax treatments already in use are sufficiently advantageous to taxpayers and
sufficiently subject to attack by the Internal Revenue Service that
taxpayers and their advisers should be aware of the defenses they may
raise against attempts by the Service to force unwanted changes. A
typical and fairly common example is the reduction in taxable income
that has resulted where inventories have been valued consistently
over a period of years under a method resulting in inventory costs
lower than those that might be determined under any valuation
SINCE
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I R C sections 452 and 462, repealed by PL 74, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. (1955).
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method acceptable to the Commissioner, such as where the taxpayer
has been using direct costing or has been valuing inventories only on
the basis of their material content.

BASIS OF COMMISSIONER'S P O W E R
In considering the basis for the power of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to require accounting changes, and the limitations
on that power, it is important to distinguish between a change of
accounting method and the correction of an error in the application of
an accounting method. The power of the Commissioner to require
correction of errors is not stated specifically in the Code. It is implicit
in his general administrative powers. Since an error is merely a deviation from correctness or accuracy, the only real limitation of the
Commissioner's power to require correctness lies in the repose brought
by the passage of time and the application of the statute of limitations.
On the other hand, if it can be demonstrated that a proposed change is
a change of accounting method, there are a number of limitations on
the Commissioner's power. It is these limitations that are the subject
of this discussion.
The source of the Commissioner's power is the provision of the
Code permitting him to require the use of a method of accounting that
clearly reflects income if the method already in use does not have that
result or if no method of accounting has been regularly used.
2

Since the taxpayer is required to compute his taxable income
under the method of accounting on the basis of which he keeps his
books, the Commissioner would seem also to have the power to require a conforming change where the tax accounting and the book
accounting are not the same. This power is so limited by other more
important considerations, however, that it is significant principally to
a new taxpayer who has not yet had time to establish a pattern of consistent use for tax purposes of a method differing from his book
method. The requirement of conformity also may be helpful to the
Commissioner in a situation where he approves the book method but
disapproves the method used in computing taxable income and uses the
lack of conformity as an additional argument against the right to use
the method he is challenging.
3
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IRC section 446 (b).
IRC section 446 (a).
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LIMITATIONS O N COMMISSIONER'S P O W E R
Since the limitations on the Commissioner's power to require
accounting-method changes have been developed partly in regulations
and court decisions and partly in practice, and since their applications
frequently are interrelated, it should be helpful to summarize them
briefly before proceeding to a more complete explanation:
1. The Commissioner's definition of an accounting method provides a substantial limitation because it separates the area in which he
may make changes completely at his discretion, as in corrections of
errors, from the area in which he must meet certain tests before his
attempts to force changes will be sustained, as in changes of methods.
2. Since section 481 provides relief from some of the changes that
might be forced by the Commissioner, it results in a practical limitation where the Commissioner is unwilling to take a step that would
result in relief he would prefer not to grant.
3. Unless the Commissioner can demonstrate that the method
he seeks to change does not reflect income clearly, he has substantially
no basis on which to proceed.
4. Consistency in the use of an accounting method and its prior
acceptance by the Commissioner may be sufficient to overcome a lack
of theoretical correctness.
5. The power to require conformity of tax accounting with different book accounting frequently is an impotent weapon because
conformity may be inconsistent with the more important tests of
consistency, prior acceptance, and clear reflection of income.
6. The clear reflection of income is so important that where a
taxpayer has corrected an error in the application of an accounting
method, the Commissioner may not be able to force a return to the
erroneous treatment, even though he did not give permission for the
change.
7. Conformity with industry practice presents another serious
obstacle to the Commissioner.
8. The Commissioner's powers are limited also by the implications of the carryover rules of sections 381(c)(4) and (5).
Although this list of limitations is an imposing one, its presentation tends to be misleading if it is not accompanied by a warning. It
frequently is difficult to overcome the Commissioner's discretionary
powers in this area. It is important to bear in mind also that there
219

have been inconsistencies among the various courts i n their application of the rules having to do with accounting-method changes. A l though they apply the same basic principles, their understanding of
what these principles may imply in a given case varies considerably.
As a result there undoubtedly will be a great deal of additional litigation within the next few years on many of these limitations.
DEFINITION OF A N ACCOUNTING METHOD

Since the Commissioner's power to accept or reject taxpayer
changes in accounting is limited to those changes where there are
changes in accounting methods, it is not surprising that the definition
of an accounting method in the regulations is very broad. The term
"method of accounting" is defined as including not only the over-all
method of accounting of the taxpayer but also the accounting treatment of any item.
4

Despite this basic definition, in presenting the requirement that
there should be no change of accounting method without permission
and in discussing the applicability of section 481 to adjustments
resulting from changes in accounting methods, the regulations limit
the definition for those special purposes by stating that a change in
method includes a change in the treatment of a material item. It is
clearly within the Commissioner's power to introduce the concept of
materiality to limit the changes that will require his permission, but
it is doubtful that the applicability of section 481 can be limited in
this way without a change in the basic definition of an accounting
method.
5

Actually the inconsistency is more apparent than real. In practice, where the taxpayer proposes to change an item of any consequence and where the change would be to his advantage, the Service
has tended to refuse permission even though the item is one that
does not come within the ordinary understanding of materiality. This
is evident in the attitude of the Service toward corrections of the
treatment of accruable real estate taxes and accruable vacation pay
4
5

Reg. section 1.446-1 (a) (1).
The failure of the basic definition to recognize substantiality or materiality is not
supported by its background in prior law and regulations, congressional intent, or
court decisions. Section 41, IRC (1939); Reg 118 section 39.41-2(a) and (c);
Sen Rep No. 1622, 83rd Cong. 300 (1954); Beacon Publishing Co. v. Com'r,
218 F(2d) 697 (10th Cir. 1955). Compare Advertisers Exchange, Inc., 25 TC
1086 (1956), aff'd 280 F(2d) 958 (2d Cir. 1957). For a further discussion see
Graves, What Constitutes a Change in Accounting Practice: The Service's

Changing Concept, Proc. N.Y.U. 16th Ann. Inst. on Fed. Taxation 556-558 (1958).
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being deducted on a cash basis by taxpayers using an accrual basis
of accounting in all other respects. Earlier revenue rulings had suggested that these accounting treatments might be corrected to the
taxpayers' benefit by application of the provisions for mitigation of
the statute of limitations, which usually are applicable when errors
are being corrected. However, the position of the Service was "clarified" in a 1959 revenue ruling which actually changed its apparent
position and held in effect that corrections of errors such as these are
actually changes in accounting method subject to approval.
6

Three recent Tax Court decisions suggest that the Court may not
accept this position and the related definition of an accounting method.
The first of these decisions, that of Alta Cooperative Elevator, is
particularly interesting because it illustrates so well the difference
between the position of the Service and that of the T a x Court. In
this case the taxpayer, who was otherwise on the accrual basis,
changed its deduction of accruable real estate taxes in 1954 from the
cash basis to the accrual basis and at the same time claimed a deduction for the taxes paid in that year but not deducted on the accrual
basis in the preceding year. The Service allowed the deduction on the
accrual basis but denied the deduction for the taxes paid. In its
original opinion the Tax Court supported the Service but in doing so
expressed views concerning the nonapplicability of section 481 and
concerning the fact that the changes made were mere corrections of
errors instead of changes in an accounting method. This language
was so unpalatable to the Service that it filed a motion for reconsideration, conceded the double deduction to the taxpayer, and prevailed upon the Court to withdraw the related portion of its original
opinion.
The position of the Tax Court that it would not glorify as an
accounting method an error in the application of an over-all method
in use by a taxpayer was stated again early in 1960 in the case of
The O Liquidating Corporation. This related to an attempt to an accrual basis taxpayer to discontinue its erroneous practice of accruing
for expected dividends on group insurance policies in the year preceding that in which the accruals actually should have been recorded.
In holding for the taxpayer the Court explained that there was not
actually a change in accounting method but a correction of an erro7
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Rev Rul 59-285 (IRB 1959-2, 458).
1959 P-H TC Memo Dec par 59033, vacated and superseded by 1959 P-H TC
Memo Dec par 59102.
1960 P-H TC Memo Dec par 60029.
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neous treatment that was inconsistent with the method of accounting
regularly employed, the accrual method. In fact the Court was quite
pointed in rejecting the Service position, saying, "It is not yet the
law that wrongs, no matter how numerous, will make right."
In the most recent case, decided by the Tax Court in August,
the Service used this same interpretation to its own advantage in
forcing a taxpayer to include the expense of incoming freight in inventory costs.
As a result of these developments many taxpayers are in an advantageous position in dealing with the definition of an accounting
method. If the taxpayer seeks a relatively narrow change that is to
his advantage, such as a change in the treatment of real estate taxes,
he can argue with good prospect of success that the change is not
a change in accounting method and that the Commissioner's permission is not required. On the other hand, if the accounting treatment
in question is one that the taxpayer would like to defend, such as the
use of the direct-costing method of inventory valuation, he should
be able to use the definition in the regulations as his defense, thus
forcing the Commissioner to overcome the other limitations on the
Commissioner's power to force an accounting-method change. (The
Court did not discuss this point in the recent case where the Commissioner obtained a change in the treatment of incoming freight,
and it is not clear whether the taxpayer offered the argument as part
of his defense.)
9

PRACTICAL LIMITATION OF SECTION

481

Where the method that the Commissioner would change was in
effect in years prior to the effective date of the 1954 Code and where
the adjustment that would result from the change includes a substantial amount accumulated prior to that date, he may be unwilling
to force the change because of the cutoff provisions of section 481.
Ordinarily when there is a change that meets the definition of a change
in accounting method, there must be recognized in the year of the
change those related adjustments that are necessary in order to prevent amounts from being duplicated or omitted in the determination
of taxable income. However, if the change was not initiated by the
taxpayer, no adjustment is to be made in respect of taxable years
prior to those to which the 1954 Code applies.
10

9

D. Loveman & Son Export Corporation, 34 TC No. 80 (1960).

10 IRC section 481(a)(2).
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Even though the Commissioner may be able to overcome the
other problem involved in a forced change, if the pre-1954 accumulation is large enough, he may be unwilling to take a step that would
have the effect of changing a taxpayer's tax accounting basis but
relieving the taxpayer of some of the burden of the related accumulated income.
It is likely that this question will arise frequently in connection
with inventory valuation. It is not unusual to find that new businesses without adequate accounting advice, and often with justifiable
questions as to the real values of their inventories, establish accounting practices of recognizing only portions of their production costs
for inventory-valuation purposes. Where these practices are applied
from year to year on an orderly basis, they should have the same
status for section 481 purposes as any other accounting method the
Commissioner might seek to change.
The Commissioner's answer to this approach, and to the application of the cutoff of section 481, probably will be an attempt to maintain that the practices in question are not actually accounting
methods. In this attempt he will be at a disadvantage because his
own regulation describes a method of accounting as including the
accounting treatment of any item. Even the questionable attempt
to inject a test of materiality for section 481 adjustment purposes
should not help him in most inventory cases because the inventory
itself is material in practically all of them and the effect of the questioned practice usually is material also.
The Tax Court will have a good opportunity to discuss this
problem in the case of Fruehauf Trailer Company. In this case the
Commissioner is trying to force the company to value its inventory
of used trailers on the basis of the lower of cost or market even though
he considered the question in the examination of tax returns for
earlier years and agreed to a valuation of only one dollar per unit.
The Commissioner seems to be contending that such a change would
not be a change in accounting method and therefore that the section
481 adjustment cutoff would not apply.
11

12

CLEAR REFLECTION OF INCOME

The most important limitation on the Commissioner lies in the
statutory grant of his power to require a change in an established
11 Reg section 1.481-1 (a)(1).
12 TC Docket No. 88221.
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accounting method if the method does not clearly reflect income.
If it does clearly reflect income, the Commissioner is powerless to act
even though the method might not be one of those that he approves
and even though it might be theoretically incorrect from an accounting viewpoint.
The Commissioner's acceptance of this view of his position is
indicated in a statement of policy with respect to depreciation adjustments that he made in 1953 in an attempt to avoid unnecessary controversies. In Rev. Ruls. 90 and 91, he took the position that adjustments in depreciation should be proposed only where there is
a clear and convincing basis for a change and he instructed revenue
agents to consider reasonable tolerances in deciding whether proposed
adjustments are substantial.
14

The question of whether there is a clear reflection of income may
not be easy to answer in a given case. There has been no attempt to
prescribe a uniform method of tax accounting for all taxpayers. Each
case must be considered on the basis of its facts, generally accepted
accounting principles, applicable trade practices, the tax accounting
rules of the regulations, and the varied views of the courts, as to the
weight and interpretation to be given these factors. Some definite
trends are discernible, but there has not yet evolved a set of clear
rules for the determination of just when income is clearly reflected.
However, there are several valid generalizations available for the
guidance of taxpayers faced with the problem.
Although the Treasury Department accepts the theory that recognition should be given to generally accepted accounting principles
and to established trade and business practices, many of the positions taken by the Treasury ignore this principle. In general, the
Treasury can be expected to favor a position that avoids any deferral
of income and any acceleration of deductions, without regard to the
impact of what might be regarded as correct accounting theory. Thus,
in considering when income is reportable by an accrual-basis taxpayer,
the Treasury tries to avoid the question of whether the income has
actually been earned, and requires that it be reported "when all the
events have occurred which fix the right to receive such income and
the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy."
15

1 6

13 See note 2.
14 IRB 1953-1, 43 and 44.
15 Reg section 1.446-1 (a) (2).
16 Reg section 1.451-1 (a).
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The Tax Court frequently is sympathetic with this revenueoriented approach to tax accounting, but the Circuit Courts have been
moving in the direction of generally accepted accounting principles.
In the most recent case, Schlude vs. Commissioner, the Eighth Circuit
refused to accept the Tax Court's application of the "claim of right"
theory and held that a dance studio was clearly reflecting its income
from dance instructions when it deferred that income until it had
actually been earned. A number of other Circuits have moved toward
accepted accounting principles in reversing decisions of the Tax
Court. These are all 1939 Code cases but they seem to be equally
applicable under the 1954 Code despite conflicting provisions of the
present regulations, which presumably would be held to be invalid.
The concept of the clear reflection of income includes not only
a question of the propriety of the accounting method used but also
the question of the significance of a proposed change. A court may
give little weight to a failure to reflect income most clearly when the
distortion is not significant. In this connection, it may be more
difficult for the Commissioner to force a change if there is no significant distortion in the years under review even though a substantial error might have accumulated in prior years.
17

18

19

20

CONSISTENCY A N D PRIOR ACCEPTANCE

Most of the decided cases dealing with accounting-method changes
involve consideration of not just one but several of the limitations on
the Commissioner's power to force action. When the Commissioner
cannot demonstrate that there has been a failure to reflect income
clearly or when the court is not convinced that the failure is sufficiently
substantial to require a change, the taxpayer should be able to resist
the change successfully if he can show that he has used the questioned method consistently in the past and that its use in connection
with earlier returns has been accepted by the Commissioner.
The importance of consistency is specifically recognized in the
regulations. In fact, in connection with inventories the Treasury
takes the position that, within the general limits of the regulations,
21

17 AFTR 2d 5683 (8th Cir. 1960).
18

Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Com'r, 267 F(2d) 523 (2nd Cir. 1959); Schuessler v.
Com'r, 230 F(2d) 722 (5th Cir. 1955); Pacific Grape Products Co. v. Com'r, 219
F(2d) 862 (9th Cir. 1955); Beacon Publishing Co. v. Com'r, supra note 5.
19 Glenn v. Kentucky Color & Chemical Co., Inc., 186 F(2d) 975 (6th Cir. 1951).

20 For a case like this in which the Commissioner conceded, see Milwaukee Valve
Company, 1958 P-H TC Memo par 58164.
2 1

Reg sections 1.446-1 (a) (2) and 1.167(b)-o(a).
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"greater weight is to be given to consistency than to any particular
method of the inventorying or basis of valuation . . . " .
The courts have recognized that consistency is more important
than theoretical correctness when the accompanying distortion of
income is not sufficient to cause them to conclude that income was
not clearly reflected. A good example of this is the Geometric Stamping Company case in which the taxpayer was permitted to continue
the use for tax purposes of the direct-costing method of valuing inventories even though there would have been an inventory adjustment
of $35,000 if the Commissioner had been upheld in his attempt to
force the change. The Court was particularly impressed by prior
consistent use and by the fact that the Commissioner had specifically
considered and accepted the method in connection with earlier examinations.
There should be no question whether there was prior acceptance
of a method by the Commissioner where it was adopted in an earlier
year at his request, where it was the subject of an earlier revenue
agent's report for a year in which it was accepted in final settlement,
or even where it can be shown that a revenue agent specifically questioned and discussed it but without making it a point of issue in his
report. In fact, the Commissioner has been held to have impliedly
given his consent to a change where he accepted on a changed basis
returns containing information indicating, but not specifically stating,
that a change had been made.
22
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ACCOUNTING CONFORMITY

The requirement that taxable income should be computed under
the accounting method used by the taxpayer in keeping his books often
is in direct conflict with the tests of clear reflection, consistency, and
prior acceptance by the Commissioner. It is well recognized in the
law and in actual practice that there will be differences between the
tax and book acccounting methods. The Code specifically states that
when a taxpayer changes the method of accounting used in keeping
his books, he may not compute his taxable income under the new
method without obtaining the approval of the Commissioner. In
26

22 Reg section 1.471-2(b).
23 26 TC 301 (1956) acq. as to result. Also see Kentucky Color & Chemical Co.,
supra note 18, and Milwaukee Valve Company, supra note 19.
24 S. Rossin & Sons, Inc. v. Com'r, 113 F(2d) 774 (2nd Cir. 1940).
25 Fowler Bros. v. Com'r, 138 F(2d) 774 (6th Cir. 1943): Tampa Tribune Publish-

ing Co., 52 AFTR 1799 (DC Fla 1957).
26 IRC section 446(e).
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fact, there are so many differences between book and tax accounting
that the Corporate Income Tax Return, Form 1120, has for many
years included a special schedule for the reconciliation of taxable
income and analysis of earned surplus.
Although the Commissioner may occasionally use the requirement of conformity as an added argument in attempting to obtain a
change, the principal impact of the conformity rule is on relatively
new taxpayers that have not yet established the consistent use of
accounting methods that clearly reflect income. When income is
clearly reflected and when the Courts are faced with the choice
between consistency and conformity, they have rejected conformity
in favor of consistency.
27

It should not be assumed, however, that the ability of a taxpayer
to maintain an established tax-accounting method permits him to
make changes in his book accounting without any consideration of the
tax consequences. Sometimes a change on the books can be a demonstration of his view on the realization of income or on the presence
of value that might otherwise be subject to question.
Of particular importance is the possible effect of a book change
in a situation where a similar change made for tax purposes would be
the subject of a section 481 adjustment that would mean the possible
applicability of the pre-1954 cutoff. Where the taxpayer initiates a
change to which section 481 applies, the cutoff is denied him. There
seems to be no basis in the law for suggesting that where the tax
accounting and the book accounting conform and a change is made
for book-accounting purposes only, there is an initiation of a change
for tax purposes also. However, it would not be surprising to find
the Commissioner taking that position where the continuing tax-accounting method is less acceptable to him than the new changed
method used on the books or where the existing tax-accounting
method does not clearly reflect income. If in these circumstances the
Commissioner should proceed with an attempt to force a conforming
change in the tax accounting, he might contend that he was merely
carrying through to its logical conclusion a change initiated by the
taxpayer in changing his book accounting, and that the section 481
cutoff should be denied. Until this point has been clarified, care should
be exercised in making changes in the books that would create this
possibility for action by the Commissioner.
27 Patchen v. Com'r, 258 F(2d) 544 (5th Cir. 1958); R. G. Bent, 26 BTA 1369

(1932) acq.; National Airlines, Inc., 9 TC 159 (1947).
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CONSISTENCY OF ERRONEOUS T R E A T M E N T

Although the test of consistency is second in importance only to
that of the clear reflection of income, the Commissioner probably will
be unable to use it to force a taxpayer to return to an erroneous accounting treatment where the taxpayer has corrected an error in the
application of an established accounting method. A good example of
this point occurred in connection with the Crosley Corporation's
handling of its tooling expenses in 1939, 1940, and 1941. In 1939
Crosley, an accrual-basis taxpayer, incurred substantial tooling expenses in connection with the manufacture of a new automobile.
Following the practice that it had established in earlier years for
deducting similar expenses in connection with the manufacture of
radios and refrigerators, it took all of the automobile tooling expenses
as a deduction in 1939. In 1946, mindful of the advantages of shifting
the deduction from 1939 to 1941 and of the resulting increase in its
excess profits credit, it filed a claim for refund for the year 1941 claiming that the deduction in 1939 should have been spread over the years
1939, 1940, and 1941. In allowing the claim the Court viewed the
adjustment as the correction of an error and disregarded the Government's contention that the company had been following its usual
method of accounting. Of course, cases such as this one should be
distinguished from those where a change of accounting method is
actually involved.
28

29

INDUSTRY PRACTICE

Ordinarily industry accounting practices are not controlling. For
example, it has been held that accounting methods forced upon a
taxpayer by a regulatory body are not binding on the Commissioner.
However, when conformity with industry practice can be added to
other factors favorable to the taxpayer, it presents another formidable
obstacle to the Commissioner if he is trying to force a change.

30

31

28 Crosley Corp. v. U.S., 229 F(2d) 376 (6th Cir. 1956). Also see Beacon Publishing
Co., supra note 5; O Liquidating Corporation, supra note 8; Scofield v. Lewis,

251 F(2d) 128 (5th Cir. 1958).
29 Advertisers Exchange, Inc., supra note 5; United States Industrial Alcohol Co.
v. Helvering, 137 F(2d) 511 (2nd Cir. 1943); Michael Drazen, 34 TC No. 109

(1960).
30 Barretville Bank & Trust Company, 1958 P-H T C Memo Dec par 58148; Old
Colony R.R. Co. v. Com'r, 284 US 522 (1932).
Pacific Grape Products Co. v. Com'r, supra note 17.

31

228

CARRYOVER OF ACCOUNTING ATTRIBUTES

The Commissioner's power to require accounting-method changes
in connection with corporate reorganizations and liquidations is limited by the requirements of Code sections 381(c) (4) and (5) for the
carryover of accounting attributes in corporate changes to which
section 381 applies. In general, the acquiring corporation is required
to use the accounting and inventory methods of the transferor corporation unless there is a conflict among the methods used, in which
event appropriate regulations are to be prescribed to resolve the conflict. Proposed regulations have not yet been issued, but it seems clear
that it was the intent of Congress to provide for the carryover of existing accounting and depreciation methods wherever practicable. Even
if the acquiring and transferor corporations were using different
methods, the implications of the congressional enactment of the carryover rules would seem to be that the different methods should be
continued if the business activities and records of the acquired and
acquiring organizations can be maintained separately and if each
method clearly reflects income.
It is not clear that the adjustment rules of section 481 should
apply if the Commissioner chooses between the accounting and inventory methods of the acquiring and acquired businesses because
separability of their activities and records cannot be maintained.
Since his power to choose flows from section 381, there may be a
question concerning whether section 481 should apply, as it would
if there were a change of accounting method under the provisions of
section 446. On the other hand, if the Commissioner forces a change
because the methods to be carried over do not clearly reflect income
and not because they cannot be maintained separately, the change
would seem to be one to which sections 446 and 481 would apply.
F I N A N C I A L A C C O U N T I N G CONSIDERATIONS

Although this discussion of the Commissioner's power to require
accounting changes has been directed entirely to the tax-accounting
problems that must be faced, it should be remembered that consideration should be given to generally accepted accounting principles if
financial reports are to be made to creditors, stockholders, and the
public. Conflicts may arise if the method of accounting used in the
books and for tax reporting is not acceptable for financial reporting.
Where a change made in the books would endanger the continued use
229

of an advantageous method for tax purposes, financial reporting standards will be met in most cases if a change is made in the financial
statements only and if there is an explanation in the accountant's
report of the differences between the financial statements and the
books.
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